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This paper aims to study if imperfections in the labor market justify a …scal
policy where public spending, labor income tax rates and debt are set to
stabilize output. We present a dynamic general equilibrium model and solve
for the optimal policy considering two di¤erent labor market setups. First
we assume a competitive labor market and then we introduce a union with
monopoly power in the labor market. Both models reach the same conclusion
as regards the stabilization policy: it is not optimal to use the …scal policy
to stabilize. We also …nd that government spending should be larger when
a competitive labor market is assumed. These main results arise both under
complete and incomplete markets for the debt.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study how the optimal …scal policy changes
when we introduce some rigidity in a competitive framework. When we talk
about imperfections in the model we are thinking about lack of competition
in the labor market. We are specially interested in analyzing the way this
optimal policy moves over the business cycle. We would like to address
questions that have traditionally been a concern of macroeconomists, for
example: Should the government apply stabilization policies?1 Should
…scal policy be di¤erent when a non-competitive labor market is assumed?
This kind of questions were answered in the past using the IS-LM model.
The IS-LM model has been one of the most popular frameworks used by
economists to derive economic policy recommendations. As King (1993)
points out, there are researchers2 ;3 who think that “the IS-LM model is
the best way to understand the determinants of aggregate demand and to
conduct contemporary policy analysis”. These authors think that, probably,
it is not worth writing more complex models because the resulting optimal
policy is the same in any case. Nevertheless, the IS-LM does not seem to be
an appropriate setup for research. Some weaknesses of the model are that it
is a static model with agents not optimizing or that the government is not
1We will say that the government uses stabilization …scal policy when public expendi-
tures are negatively correlated with output and when the correlation between tax rates
and output is positive.
2“The textbook IS-LM model, augmented by the Phillips curve, continues to provide
the best way to interpret discussions of economic policy in the press and among policy
makers”. Mankiw (1990).
3“Right or wrong, the IS-LM model, and its intellectual cousins, the Mundell-Fleming
model and the various incarnations of aggregate supply-aggregate demand models, have
proved incredibly useful at analyzing ‡uctuations and the e¤ects of policy”. Blanchard
(1997).
1aware of its budget constraint.
We aim to use a di¤erent approach to analyze these questions. Public
…nance literature has applied Ramsey’s formulation to analyze …scal policy
over time. Barro (1979) develops a theory of optimal public …nance in a
deterministic model. Kydland and Prescott (1980) examine the problem of
optimal policy selection within the rational expectations competitive frame-
work. Lucas and Stokey (1983) considera stochastic economy without capital
and study the structure and time-consistency of optimal …scal and monetary
policy. There has been a number of articles which have analyzed optimal
…scal taxation in an extended Lucas and Stokey’s environment. For exam-
ple, Zhu (1992) considers an economy with capital accumulation and Marcet,
Sargent and Seppälä (1996) only allow for risk-free debt.
We want to analyze how the optimal …scal policy moves over the cycle
under di¤erent labor market setups. More precisely, we are interested in
studying how the following three variables evolve: government expenditure,
tax rates and debt issues. This requires a government taking decisions about
its spending, that is, an endogenous government expenditure. Thus, we are
going to assume that the government chooses the level of public spending
and that consumers derive utility from it. All the models we have mentioned
above assume that government expenditure plays no speci…c role in the econ-
omy and is taken as exogenously given by all the agents. Jones, Manuelli and
Rossi (1993) and Rojas (1993) study the Ramsey optimal policy including
government spending as a productive input in the model. The …rst paper
aims to analyze how growth and welfare change when there is a switch to
the optimal policy. Rojas (1993) is interested in the cyclical properties of the
2optimal policy. His model does not allow for the possibility of issuing debt
and labor is inelastically supplied. He predicts a procyclical public policy in
the sense that both public investment and capital income taxes are positively
correlated with output.
We also depart from Lucas and Stokey (1983) in that we introduce rigidi-
ties in the labor market. Lucas and Stokey assume a linear technology which
yields an inelastic labor demand, that is, the inverse labor demand does not
depend on the labor allocation. If we considered such a production function,
the union would not have any chance to set wages and both the competi-
tive model and the non-competitive one would yield the same results. That
is why we assume a non-linear production function which implies a ‡exible
demand schedule.
We present a dynamic model with agents living forever. In our economy
there is a representative consumer, a …rm and a government and all of them
take decisions optimally. We introduce two di¤erent assumptions with re-
spect to wage setting: …rst, we assume that both the …rm and the worker
are price takers and then, we consider the case in which there is a union
with an e¤ective monopoly in the labor market. The government provides
a public good and …nances its expenditures with labor income taxes and
debt. First, we will analyze the case in which debt is state contingent and
complete markets are assumed. And then we will study if the results change
when only risk free debt is allowed. Although the second case seems much
more interesting, the complete markets assumption makes equilibria easier to
compute and interpret. The government is assumed to be a Ramsey planner
who decides the optimal …scal policy maximizing the consumer’s utility.
3We compute the full-commitment solution. If the government could re-
optimize in the future, it would do something di¤erent from what it had
promised to do and the solution would be time-inconsistent.
The computational issues associated with the …nding of the equilibrium
stochastic processes are a crucial element of our work. Due to the assump-
tions made and the model formulation itself, closed form solutions are not
available and we have to use computer simulations.
The two models analyzed deliver the same conclusion with respect to the
stabilization policy: it is not optimal to use the …scal policy to o¤set the
negative e¤ects of the cycle.
We also …nd that, due to the additional distortion introduced in the la-
bor market, the optimal public spending is lower in the model considering a
union than in the competitive one. The resulting government expenditure is
smaller both in its level and as a proportion of the output of the economy.
These conclusions go against the conventional belief that rigidities lead to
more active public policies and a large role for government intervention. In
contrast with traditional analyses, our model does not suggest that an ac-
tive stabilization policy should be carried out when a non-competitive labor
market is assumed.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we assume that the govern-
ment can issue state contingent debt; we set the basic theoretical framework
and consider two models, the competitive one in which both the worker and
the …rm are price takers in the labor market, and the non-competitive model
in which we assume that there is a union which sets wages; and we analyze
the results using numerical simulations. Section 3 performs the same exercise
4but assuming that only risk-free debt is available to the government. Finally,
section 4 concludes.
2 The model with state contingent debt
2.1 The basic setup
We consider a production economy with three in…nitely-lived agents: a rep-
resentative consumer, a …rm, and the government. There is a private con-
sumption good (ct) and a public good (gt) that satisfy
ct + gt = yt (1)
where yt is the aggregate production.
In Lucas and Stokey (1983) a linear production function is assumed. This
implies that the demand for labor is inelastic. In this paper we are inter-
ested in studying the …scal policy in di¤erent labor market setups assuming
di¤erent degrees of rigidity in this market. In order for the non-perfect labor
market to make sense, a non-rigid labor demand is required. We can obtain
this by assuming a technology showing decreasing returns to labor input. We
consider a constant returns to scale concave production function:
yt = f(µt;1 ¡xt;`t) (2)
where xt denotes leisure, `t is land and µt is a productivity shock following a
Markov process:
lnµt = ½lnµt¡1 + "t; j½j < 1; "t » N(0;¾
2
") (3)
5This technology shock is the only source of uncertainty in our economy.
The study of stabilizing public expenditure policies requires a model with
endogenous government spending. We have endogenized this variable assum-
ing that there is a new consumption good provided as government services.
The consumer derives utility from private consumption, public spending






t u(ct;gt;xt); 0 < ¯ < 1 (4)
The utility function u is strictly increasing in the three arguments and strictly
concave. Private consumption, government expenditures and leisure are nor-
mal (non-inferior). E0 denotes the mathematical expectation conditioned on
time 0 information.
The representative consumer is endowed with one unit of time which is
devoted to work and leisure. He also owns ` units of land that will be inelas-
tically supplied to the …rm. Besides, the household can lend to or borrow
from the government with a full array of contingent one-period bonds that





t(µ)bt(µ)dµ = (1 ¡ ¿t)wt(1 ¡ xt) + bt¡1(µt) + p
`
t`t (5)
where ¿t is the income tax, wt the wage rate and p`
t is the land price. On the
other hand, pb
t(µ) denotes the price the consumer has to pay in period t to get
one unit of consumption good at t + 1 if the productivity shock realization
is µ at this time and bt(µ) is the number of units of debt (contingent on µ)
held in period t. We assume that the consumer is a price taker in the goods
6market, in the land market and in the contingent claims market. However,
we are going to consider two di¤erent kinds of behavior for the consumer in
the labor market. First, we assume that the worker is a price taker in the
labor market. And second, we consider that the worker gives his labor to a
union which has monopoly power in the labor market and which sells labor
to the …rm. In this case the union sets the wage and the labor allocation
is that resulting from the …rm’s labor demand. The household’s problem is
to choose fct;bt;xt;`tg maximizing the discounted sum of utilities given by
(4) subject to the temporal sequence of budget constraints (5) and taking
{¿t;gt;b¡1;µt;pb
t;p`






Pr(µt+1 = µ n µt) (6)
where uct is the marginal utility of consumption at t. The consumer supplies
inelastically the land he owns. The derivative with respect to leisure will be
considered later.
The …rm is supposed to be a price-taker in all markets. It produces
the consumption good using land and labor as inputs. The …rm seeks to
maximize its pro…ts,




tg are given to the …rm. The solution to the problem of the
…rm implies that inputs inverse demands equal the corresponding marginal
productivity, that is,
4In the competitive model, the consumer is also a price taker in the labor market.





t(¢) ´ f`(µt;1 ¡ xt;:)
where f1¡x and f` are the derivatives of the production function with respect
to labor and land respectively.
Finally, the government provides the public consumption good and …-
nances its expenditures by labor income taxes and public debt. The govern-
ment budget constraint is the following:





In our setup, the government is assumed to be a benevolent social planner
whose objective is to choose a …scal policy in order to maximize the welfare
of the economy. The government is aware of the household’s answer to his
policy announcements and takes this reaction into account when it solves
its maximization problem. This application of optimal taxation theory is
known as the Ramsey problem in the literature.5 In other words, the social
planner faces the following restrictions: the temporal sequence of budget
constraints (8), the feasibility constraint (1) and the …rst order conditions
resulting fromthe programs solved by the other agents in the economy. Using
standard arguments, we can prove6 that the restriction that (6) and (8) place
5Basically, our model presents a Stackelberg game. Here, the government (the Stack-
elberg leader) chooses the …scal policy …rst and the consumer (the follower) observes this
decision before choosing his consumption and leisure allocations. To …nd the equilibrium,
we are using the backward induction procedure.
6A formal proposition and proof showing this result can be found in Chari and Kehoe
(1998).








[¿twt(1 ¡ xt) ¡ gt] (9)
That is, the present value of outstanding government obligations at time 0
must equal the present value of the excesses of tax revenues over government
expenditures on goods.
2.2 The competitive model
In this subsection we describe the competitive model. We assume that both
the consumer and the …rm are price-takers in the goods and in the inputs
markets.
When the consumer takes the wage as given, the labor supply and the






where uct and uxt are the marginal utility of consumption and leisure respec-
tively.
7We assume that there are high enough debt limits to prevent the possibility of a Ponzi











8We can prove this result because of the complete market assumption which permits
the government to sell bonds contingent on every possible realization of the productivity
shock µ.
9In our analysis, it is going to be useful to de…ne the competitive equilib-
rium allocations as follows:
De…nition 1: Given b¡1 and the productivity shock process fµtg, a compet-
itive equilibrium is a stochastic process of prices fpb
t(µ);wt;p`
tg, allocations
fct;bt;xt;`tg and …scal policy fgt;¿t;btg such that:
i) fct;bt;xt;`tg maximizes the consumer’s objective function (4) subject
to the budget constraints (5) given fpb
t(µ);wt;p`
tg and fgt;¿tg.
ii) fxt;`tg maximizes the …rm’s pro…ts (7) given fwt;p`
tg.
iii) The government budget constraint (8) and the economy’s technology
constraint (1) are satis…ed at each period.
iv) The labor, land, consumption goods and bonds markets clear.
As has been pointed out in the preceding subsection, the Ramsey problem
consists of maximizing the objective function (4) over the competitive equi-














t [uc;t(wt(1 ¡ xt) ¡ gt) ¡ ux;t(1 ¡ xt)]
ct + gt = f(µt;1 ¡xt;`)
wt = f1¡x(µt;1 ¡ xt;`)
10fµtg , b¡1 as given












t [uc;t(wt(1 ¡xt) ¡ gt) ¡ ux;t(1 ¡ xt)]
#
where ¸ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the implementability con-
straint.
The …rst order conditions of this problem are:9
¡uc;tf1¡x;t + ux;t + ¸-1t = 0 (11)
¡uc;t + ug;t + ¸-2t = 0 (12)
where
-1t = ucc;tf1¡x;t [f1¡x;t(1 ¡xt) ¡ gt] ¡uc;tf1¡x1¡x;t(1 ¡ xt)
+uc;tf1¡x;t + uxx;t(1 ¡ xt) ¡ ux;t
-2t = uc;t + (ucc;t ¡ ucg;t)[f1¡x;t(1 ¡ xt) ¡ gt]
If an optimal policy exists and the solution is interior, the optimal al-
locations must satisfy (11), (12), the resource constraint (1) and the imple-
mentability constraint (9). These …rst order conditions can be written as
9If we consider b¡1 6= 0 the …rst order conditions are slightly di¤erent in period 0.
11equations of the form F(zt;µt;¸) = 0 where zt is a vector of endogenous vari-
ables. Hence, we can conclude that the optimal …scal policy only depends on
the contemporaneous productivity shock µt and the Lagrange multiplier ¸,
and it has the same correlation properties as the former.10 We can represent
the endogenous variables by a time-invariant function of µt and ¸:
(ct;xt;gt;¿t;pt;bt) = d
C(¸;µt)
2.3 The non-competitive model
As we have pointed out before, this paper’s goal is to analyze how the optimal
…scal policy changes when we introduce some imperfection in a neoclassical
framework. We introduce these rigidities in the labor market assuming that
there is a union which has an e¤ective monopoly on the sale of labor to the
…rm. It is assumed that the worker gives his labor to the union and it is
the union who deals with the …rm. The …rm has a downward-sloping labor-
demand curve which speci…es how much labor it is willing to hire at any wage.
In our model this labor-demand curve is a constraint on union behavior. The
union is going to maximize the objective function (4) subject to the sequence
of budget constraints and taking f¿t;gt;b¡1;µt;pb
tg and wt(¢) as given. In this
case, the union takes into account that the wage the worker is going to get
depends on his own labor decisions. As a result, the consumer’s problem …rst
order conditions are (6) and the following equation:
(1 ¡¿t)[wt(¢) + w
0
t(¢)(1 ¡ xt)] =
ux;t
uc;t
We can rewrite this expression as follows:
10This result is analogous to that found in Lucas and Stokey (1983).
12(1 ¡ ¿t)wt =
ux;t
uc;t
(1 + mt) (13)
where mt is the positive mark-up the union gets due to the monopoly power
it has in the labor market.11 This equation shows that the marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and consumption is not equal to the marginal
rate of transformation, not only because of the labor income tax rate but
also because of this mark-up. Another conclusion we can draw from this
expression, for any allocation fct;gt;xtg the labor income tax rate is higher
in the neoclassical model.
The following de…nition characterize the equilibrium with imperfect com-
petition allocations over which the government maximizes its objective func-
tion:
De…nition 2: Given b¡1 and the productivity shock process fµtg, an equilib-
rium with imperfect competition isastochasticprocess of pricesfpb
t(µ);wt;p`
tg,
allocations fct;bt;xt;`tg and …scal policy fgt;¿t;btg such that:
i) fct;bt;xt;`tg maximizes the consumer’s objective function (4) subject
tothe budget constraints (5) given fpb
t(µ);p`
tg and fgt;¿tg and the…rm’s
labor-demand curve wt(¢).
ii) fxt;`tg maximizes the …rm’s pro…ts (7) given fwt;p`
tg.





This mark-up is positive by the concavity of the production function.
13iii) The government budget constraint (8) and the economy’s technology
constraint (1) are satis…ed at each period.
iv) The labor, land, consumption goods and bonds markets clear.













t [uc;t(wt(1 ¡xt) ¡ gt) ¡ ux;t(1 + mt)(1 ¡ xt)]
#
The …rst order conditions we …nd are:
¡uc;tf1¡x;t + ux;t + ¸©1t = 0 (14)
¡uc;t + ug;t + ¸©2t = 0 (15)
where
©1t = ucc;tf1¡x;t [f1¡x;t(1 ¡xt) ¡ gt] ¡uc;tf1¡x1¡x;t(1 ¡ xt)
+uc;tf1¡x;t + uxx;t(1 ¡ xt)(1 + mt) ¡ ux;t(1 + mt)
+ux;tmx;t(1 ¡ xt)
©2t = uc;t + (ucc;t ¡ ucg;t)[f1¡x;t(1 ¡ xt) ¡ gt]
with mx;t being the derivative of the mark-up with respect to leisure
These are the equations we have to solve, jointly with the implementabil-
ity constraint, in order to …nd the optimal paths for the endogenous variables.





We are interested in studying the dynamic equilibrium allocations for the
models described in the previous section. In both models considered there are
two state variables(¸;µt) whilethe endogenousvariablesare(ct;xt;gt;¿t;pt;bt).
We have to specify functional forms for both, the production function
and preferences. We assume a Cobb-Douglas technology showing constant
returns to scale:
f(µt;1 ¡ xt;`t) = µt(1 ¡xt)
°`
1¡°
t 0 < ° < 1












0 < ® < 1
This utility function is additively separable in consumption and leisure. We
are considering a composite consumption index which includes both the pri-
vately and the publicly provided good.12
12This idea appears in Kormendi (1983), Aschauer (1985) and Christiano and Eichen-
baum (1992) where it is assumed that consumption services (cs
t) are related to private (ct)
and public consumption (gt) as follows:
cs
t = ct + ®gt
However, we want to allow for some complementarity between ct and gt and that is why
we assume this relationship between these two variables. The main results are robust to
di¤erent speci…cations for this relationship.
15The …rst order conditions are non-linear functions of the endogenous vari-
ables. Due to these strong non-linearities there is no way of obtaining closed
form solutions to the models. Furthermore, decision rules depend not only on
µt but also on the unobservable shadow price ¸ and we have to solve in both
economies for comparability purposes. Taking ¸ as given like in Lucas and
Stokey, we could study the sign of the derivative of the endogenous variables
with respect to the shock. However, comparisons between the equilibrium
paths in the competitive and the non-competitive models require solving for
this variable. These facts lead to the need for numerical simulations.
In order to …nd the equilibrium solutions for both models we have to
specify values for the parameters appearing in them. The values we have
chosen are presented in Table 1.13
This parameterization is quite similar to that used in the real business
cycle literature. That is the case of the subjective time discount rate (¯), the
parameter of the production technology (°), and the parameter values for the
productivity shock innovation process (½ and ¾"). The value chosen for the
parameter ® matches the empirically observed fact that private consumption
is about four times larger than public spending in the deterministic version
of the model. Finally, while the choice for ¾1 is quite standard, the choice
for ¾2 is arbitrary but this does not a¤ect the results.
13Our aim is to study if imperfections in the labor market justify a di¤erent optimal
…scal policy and not so much to match the observed data. That is why we did not calibrate
the economy as well as possible to the data.











We use the following procedure to compute the solution. We start with a
given government initial indebtedness b¡1 and a realization for the technology
shock fµtgT
t=0. Then, assuming a …xed value for the Lagrange multiplier ¸
associated with the implementability constraint we solve equations (11)-(12)
in the competitive case (or (14)-(15) in the non-competitive one). We obtain
an allocation fct;xt;gtg that solves the …rst order conditions for this partic-
ular realization of the productivity shock. If we repeat this procedure using
N di¤erent realizations of the shock we get the N equilibrium paths for the
endogenous variables given these shock sequences. Next, we average across
these N realizations to approximate the expectation in the right-hand side
of the implementability constraint (9). If this average is di¤erent from b¡1
we change the proposed ¸ and iterate until the implementability constraint
is satis…ed.
17We present our results graphically plotting the decision rules dC(¸;¢) and
dNC(¸;¢). Actually, these …gures show the correlation between the variables
depicted and can be used to study their cyclical properties. Figure 1 shows
these plots.
As we can see, consumption is pro-cyclical in both models and it is larger
in the neoclassical one. The di¤erence between the models with respect
to this variable is larger when the economy is booming, that is, when the
productivity shock µt is higher.
Government spending moves with the technological shock. Therefore, we
can conclude that there is no stabilization policy with respect to public ex-
penditure. We do not observe a crowding-out e¤ect of private consumption
by the public expenditures. On the contrary, both private consumption and
public services inherit the autocorrelation properties from the technologi-
cal shock and show the same behavior over the cycle. In order to analyze
properly whether there are stabilization policies we should study not the
level of government expenditures, but the public spending-output ratio. The
corresponding graph shows that optimality requires this ratio to be fairly
constant. Hence, the …scal policy implemented by the government seeks to
stabilize this ratio and public services are not used to o¤set the impact of re-
cessions over private consumption. These two …gures deliver one of the main
conclusions of the paper: both the level of government expenditures and the
public spending-output ratio are larger in the competitive model than in the
non-competitive one. Besides, the slope of the curve depicted is smaller in
the model with imperfections in the labor market (1.2 vs 1.4 in the neoclas-
sical model). Therefore, we can conclude that when the government sets the
18…scal policy optimally, not only the size of the public sector is larger in the
neoclassical model but also this government reacts more actively to produc-
tivity shocks. This result goes against the conventional belief that keynesian
economics14 imply that an active stabilization public policy is desirable.15
Keynesians recommended that the government should carry out policies of
demand so as to stabilize the economy. In fact, using the IS-LM framework to
analyze the role of government in economic policy, it can be concluded that
the e¤ect of public spending is less important when neoclassical assumptions
are made.
Leisure is a pro-cyclical variable. In good times, that is, when the tech-
nological shock is high, the labor marginal revenue is also higher and the
consumer earns more. The household has to work to get income to buy
the consumption good, but it also derives utility from leisure. As a result,
when the wage per unit of time worked is high enough, the consumer de-
cides to increase his leisure time. The household works fewer hours in the
non-competitive framework, since the union sets higher wages.
The last …gures permit us to draw the following conclusions on how the
government funds its expenditures. As in the public spending case, the pub-
lic sector does not use taxes to stabilize the economy. Optimal labor income
tax rates should be smaller when the productivity shock is high in order to
14Modelling “new keynesian” as a deviation from perfect competition agrees with
Mankiw and Romer (1991): “A recurrent theme in new Keynesian economics is that devi-
ations from perfect competition may be crucial for understanding economic ‡uctuactions”.
However, “new keynesian” means many things in the literature and other authors consider
that more requirements are needed to call a model “new keynesian”.
15“The main task should be to prevent large ‡uctuations by a stable long-term pro-
gramme” (Keynes, Activities 1940-1946 shaping the Post-War World: Employment and
Commodities vol.XXVII)
19minimize the distortions introduced by this kind of taxation. In good times
it is not worth distorting economic decisions with higher tax rates. The in-
crease in wages makes tax revenues larger even with smaller tax rates. We
notice that taxes are always smaller in the non-competitive case. The rea-
son which explains this result is the following: in the model with rigidities
the government spends less and, as we will see later, it prefers to …nance
these expenditures issuing bonds. Due to the existence of a union, the non-
competitive model introduces an additional distortion in the labor market.
Consequently, the e¤ect of a tax is even worse in this framework. The gov-
ernment tries to reduce these negative e¤ects setting smaller tax rates. We
may think that the government, as the Stackelberg leader in the game, could
set a labor-income tax aimed to deal with the advantage the worker has
in the labor market. The government would like to subsidize labor in the
non-competitive model in order to reach the e¢cient allocation of this input
and increase output. The only taxation instrument available is the distort-
ing labor-income tax rate and these subsidies are not feasible. Therefore, in
the non-competitive framework the government sets a positive labor income
tax rate, being this tax smaller than that set by the “neoclassical Ramsey
planner”. As a result, wages are smaller before and after tax in the model
without imperfections.
We have also plotted the government debt payments for each realization
of the technology shock.16 This variable is positive in bad times (when
the technological shock is below its mean which is one approximately) and
negative when the shock is higher. Therefore, as we could expect given the
16Appendix A describes how this debt payments have been calculated.
20complete market assumption, the government uses debt as a sort of self-
insurance. Besides, we observe superavits (negative primary de…cit) in bad
times and de…cits in good times. This result reverses that found in papers
assuming an exogenous government spending, like Lucas and Stokey (1983)
or Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) where the smooth optimal tax rate
involve running a surplus during boomings and de…cits in bad times. In our
paper, the planner also aims to smooth distortions over states of nature, but
now, the additional degree of freedomin determining the public expenditures,
explains the di¤erent result.
Finally, the last plot in Figure 1 enables us to conclude that the propor-
tion of public expenses (including the provision of the public good and debt
payments) …nanced with debt17 is larger in the non-competitive model. This
outcome seems to agree with what is commonly seen as a keynesian policy
feature.
In order to gain intuition about our results, we are going to consider the
…rst best solution, that is, the case which assumes that public policy does
not distort the agent’s economic decisions because expenditures are …nanced
with lump-sum taxes. Table 2 shows the comparisons among the …rst best
solution and those found to the two models studied:
17The public sector’s income is equal to tax revenues ( ¿twt(1 ¡ xt) ) plus the money
he gets selling contingent debt (
R
pt(µ)bt(µ)dµ ). The variable appearing in Figure 9 has
been calculated as the fraction of government revenues raised through debt purchases for
the states of nature in which the household receives bond payments from the government.
21Table 2: Comparisons among models
(means of variables)
First Best Competitive Non-Competitive
G/Y 0.2 0.19 0.18
C/Y 0.8 0.81 0.82
xt 57.65 61 66
The assumption that the government …nances its expenditure with lump-
sum taxation yields the Pareto-optimal solution. When we include labor-
income taxes in the model public policy is going to distort not only the
leisure equilibrium allocation but also the consumption one. The competitive
model adds this distortion to the …rst best case and moves the equilibrium
solution away from the optimal one. The existence of a union introduces an
additional distortion which makes the equilibrium depart from the …rst best
in the same way as the distortion due to the labor-income taxation. The
government cannot do much to prevent the union from raising wages but it
can reduce the distortion introduced by taxation by diminishing these taxes.
As a result, the government in the non-competitive model spends less and
…nances a larger proportion of its expenditure with debt.
To sum up, the model with imperfect competition in the labor market
delivers the same conclusion as the competitive one with respect to the sta-
bilization policy recommendations: using government spending to o¤set the
negative productivity shocks is not optimal. Furthermore, the assumption of
the existence of a union with monopoly power in the labor market results in
smaller government expenditure.
223 The incomplete markets model
Once we have got the intuition behind the results with the complete markets
assumption, we aim to perform the same kind of exercise as before but as-
suming that the only asset available to the government is risk-free debt. The
contingent debt assumption made in the preceding section is useful because
it makes equilibria easier to compute. However, relaxing this assumption
we can study how debt purchases evolve over the business cycle. The debt
pattern observed in the complete markets case is not very interesting. In this
model, debt can be represented by a time-invariant function of the produc-
tivity shock. That is, the government always purchases the same quantity
of bonds contingent on each state of nature. And these debt issues do not
depend, for instance, on outstanding debt obligations. We think that more
interesting results may be obtained if a di¤erent debt structure is considered.
Moreover, we think that the results we have got may be biased by the
complete markets assumption. With complete markets for the debt, agents
purchase bonds in order to “insure” themselves against any contingency it
may occur. Then the role of the government as the economic agent who has
to decide a policy aimed to deal with the negative e¤ects of shocks may be
smaller. The consumer buys this contingent debt and knows that if a bad
shock happens tomorrow the debt payments will be larger. The government
does not provide more public goods in bad times because the tax required to
…nance this expenditure should be too large and it is not worth introducing
such a big distortion in the economy. To some extent, this stabilizer role is
ful…lled by the non-distorting contingent debt.18
18Lucas and Stokey (1983) note that state contingent debt acts as a shock absorber in
23In this section we are going to present two models with the same features
as those in section 2 but now assuming that the only debt in this economy is
risk-free debt. The theoretical setup is basically the same asthe onedescribed
in subsection 2.1. Now the consumer’s budget constraint is the following:
ct + p
b
tbt = (1 ¡¿t)wt(1 ¡ xt) + bt¡1 + p
`
t`t (16)
Therefore, the consumer buys today the right to receive bt units of con-
sumption good tomorrow no matter the state of nature. In the incomplete
market setup we are going to bound the debt market imposing debt limit
constraints, that is,
M · bt · M
As in the model presented above the consumer maximizes the objective
function (3) subject to his budget constraint (16). The …rst order condition
resulting from the derivative with respect to leisure is the same as in the
complete markets case, i.e. (10) in the competitive model and (13) in the
non-competitive one. Again, the consumer supplies inelastically his land







The …rm’s problem remains the same as in the complete markets frame-
work. The …rst order conditions resulting from this problem imply that
inverse labor demand of each input equals the corresponding marginal pro-
ductivity.
these models.
24Again the Ramsey planner sets the …scal policy that maximizes the con-
sumer’s objective function taking into account how the consumer reacts to
these policy announcements.
When we assumed complete debt markets we summarized the temporal
sequence of government budget constraints, and the …rst order conditions of
the consumer’s problem in one equation, i.e. (9). As it is proved in Marcet,
Sargent and Seppälä (1996) this does not happen in the incomplete markets
setup anymore. Now, the restriction that these equations place on equilib-







[¿t+jwt+j(1 ¡ xt+j) ¡ gt+j] 8t (18)
In order to solve the Ramsey problem considering this sequence of equa-
tions we have adopted the same approach as Marcet, Sargent and Seppälä




















where ¹t is the time varying Lagrange multiplier associated with the time t
implementability constraint, and À1t and À2t are the multipliers associated
with the debt constraints.





t fu(ct;gt;xt) ¡ Ãtuc;t [¿twt(1 ¡xt) ¡ gt]
25+ ¹tuc;tbt¡1 + À1t(M ¡bt) + À2t(bt ¡ M)
o
where
Ãt = Ãt¡1 + ¹t Ã¡1 = 0 (19)
Now, the optimal paths for the endogenous variables at time t are a time
invariant function of three state variables (Ãt¡1;bt¡1;µt).
If we consider the model without imperfections, the …rst order conditions
of the Ramsey problem can be written as:
¡uc;tf1¡x;t + ux;t + Ãt-1t ¡ ¹tucc;tbt¡1f1¡x;t = 0
¡uc;t + ug;t + Ãt-2t ¡ ¹t(ucc;t ¡ ucg;t)bt¡1 = 0





where -1t and -2t are the expressions appearing in the …rst order conditions
calculated for the complete markets case.
On the other hand, the …rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem when
it is assumed that the union sets wages are the following:
¡uc;tf1¡x;t + ux;t + Ãt©1t ¡ ¹tucc;tbt¡1f1¡x;t = 0
¡uc;t + ug;t + Ãt©2t ¡ ¹t(ucc;t ¡ ucg;t)bt¡1 = 0





We want to …nd the optimal paths for the endogenous variables of the
model (ct;xt;gt;¿t;pt;bt;À1t;À2t). The state of the economy is given by three
26variables (µt;Ãt¡1;bt¡1). We are also interested in the transition functions
that show how Ãt and bt¡1 depend on the vector of state variables.
As we can see from the equations above, when we assume incomplete
markets we cannot get rid of expectations in the …rst order conditions of the
Ramsey problem. So we have to deal with them when solving the model. The
method we have used is the parameterized expectations algorithm (PEA) of
Marcet (1988). Details about this method and its implementation to …nd
the optimal allocations are described in Appendix B.
We present di¤erent ways to analyze the results of the simulations. When
we studied the complete markets case we simply plotted the decision rules.
The incomplete markets assumption imply decision rules depending on three
state variables: the technological shock µt, the multiplier Ãt¡1 and the out-
standing debt at t, bt¡1. As far as we are not able to draw a graph displaying
the relation among four variables, decision rules can not be plotted in the
incomplete markets case. The graphs in Figure 2 resemble those found in
the complete markets case but now, when we plot the productivity shock
versus the endogenous variables we are only studying the relation on average
between them. Private consumption, public expenses and leisure move with
the technology shock while the labor income tax rate is negatively correlated
with this variable. There are two new variables that we can study when we
include risk-free debt in the model: debt purchases and the excess burden
of taxation. In the complete markets setting, we could only compute the
debt payments and these payments were positive in bad times and negative
during expansions. When incomplete markets are assumed, debt purchases
are always positive and are larger when the productivity shock is higher. An-
27other new result is that referred to the deadweight loss of taxation which is
measured by the multiplier Ãt. When we assumed that there were complete
markets for the contingent debt the deadweight loss of taxation was mea-
sured by the time invariant Lagrange multiplier ¸. Now, in the incomplete
markets case, this excess burden is going to be time varying. This variable
can be interpreted as a sort of shadow price. It indicates the cost of public
expenditure due to the use of distorting taxes to fund it. Figure 2 shows
that the absolute value of the deadweight loss is larger during expansions.
Therefore, the cost of increasing taxes is higher in good times. This seems to
be a reasonable explanation for the decreasing pattern observed for the tax
rate.
Another way to display the results is to plot the endogenous variables
versus the technological shock holding the debt, bt¡1, …xed and setting the
multiplier, Ãt¡1, at its mean conditional value on the debt. Figures 3a and 3b
show these results. The same conclusions are reached when we use this way
to analyze the simulated series. Private consumption, government spending
and leisure are positively correlated with output. The government spending-
output ratio should remain constant over the business cycle. Again, the
…gure shows that the labor income tax rate is downward sloping. We have
displayed these graphs for di¤erent values for the debt and the results are
the same.
We have also computed the impulse response functions for the decision
rules. For the simulated series, we run regressions of the endogenous variables
against f"t¡sgL
s=0, being " the innovation of the technological shock µ. Fig-
ure 4 displays the estimated coe¢cients. This analysis allows us to study the
28e¤ect of an independent shock on future variables. These …gures show that
an unexpected shock in the technology has a positive e¤ect on private con-
sumption, government spending and leisure. On the other hand, the e¤ect of
the shock on the government spending-output ratio is small, permanent and
almost constant. This explains the result that optimality implies that this
ratio should be constant. As far as the shock " has a zero mean, the e¤ects
of the present and past realizations of " on the government spending-output
ratio at t cancel out. Our results also predict a positive response for debt
purchases and a negative one for the labor income tax rate.
The di¤erent exercises performed to analyze the results of simulations
lead to similar conclusions. Besides, these conclusions are the same as those
we obtained in the complete markets case. It is not optimal to implement
stabilization policies. As in the framework assuming contingent debt and
complete markets, the optimal level of government spending should increase
as much as output during expansions, that is, the public spending-output
ratio should be constant over the cycle. These higher level of expenditure is
optimally supported by lower taxes and larger debt issues. The procyclicality
of debt is a new result that arises when only risk-free debt is allowed. The
government has to decide how much of the larger public spending is …nanced
by debt and how much by taxes. As long as the excess burden of taxation is
larger during expansions, the government increases the primary de…cit and
issues more debt. Moreover, government income has to increase not only
because of the larger public provision of the good but also because debt
obligations are higher.
The graphs we have just described show the results of simulations for
29the competitive model. The conclusions for the non competitive model are
qualitatively the same. As in the complete markets case, we are interested
in comparing the results obtained in the models assuming di¤erent behavior
in the labor market. Due to the special features of the decision rules in the
incomplete markets model, we can not use the plots of the technological shock
versus the endogenous variables to compare the competitive model and the
non competitive one. The reason is that in spite of the fact that we can
display the decision rules corresponding to a given realization of the shock,
we cannot set the other two state variables at the same level.
We have calculated the mean of the di¤erent endogenous variables in both
the competitive and the non-competitive model. These values are presented
in Table 3:
Table 3: Means of Variables
Competitive Non-competitive
model model
Private consumption 8.99 8.38




Tax rate 0.30 0.30
Tax revenues 2.22 2.05
Ã -0.12 -0.36
Debt price 0.95 0.95
30This analysis allows us to draw the same conclusions as in the complete
markets framework. The new distortion introduced in the labor market lead
the government to reduce its spending, in levels and as a proportion of out-
put, and to …nance its expenses (including also debt payments) mostly with
non-distorting debt (65% in the non competitive model versus 46% in the
competitive one) Again, in the non competitive framework, the worker re-
ceives higher wages and devotes more time to leisure. It is important to
notice the di¤erence between the values for the Lagrange multiplier Ã in the
steady state. This implies that the excess burden of taxation is much larger
in the non-competitive case.
We would also like to study which of the economies reacts more actively
to shocks. We will use the impulse response functions. The estimated co-
e¢cients allow us to carry out these comparisons. Figure 5 displays these
estimates. Both models show similar patterns and slopes for all the endoge-
nous variables. When the technology variable µt is larger than expected the
increase in public spending is larger in the competitive model. However, the
main di¤erences between the two frameworks come from the variables related
to the funding of government expenditures. When we assume that wages are
set by the union, a positive unexpected shock in the technology causes op-
timal debt to increase more and optimal labor income tax rate be smaller
than in the competitive case. The government in the non-competitive model
takes advantage of the good state of the technology to reduce distortions in
the economy. Thus, it increases public expenses and debt issues in such a
way that a reduction in distortions through a smaller labor income tax rate
is achieved. In this model, welfare considerations make larger increases in
31public expenditures not desirable.
To sum up, the results of the simulations when we assume incomplete
markets lead to the same conclusions for labor, taxes and government ser-
vices. The optimal …scal response to shocks to the technology should not
be what its commonly known as stabilization policies. On the contrary, the
government should increase its expenses and decrease labor income tax rates
when the economy is booming. As expected, the result for debt purchases
is di¤erent from that found under complete markets. Now, this debt is al-
ways positive and increases with the technology shock. The comparisons
between the competitive model and the non-competitive one also draw the
same implications. The union introduces a new distortion in the economy
and optimality requires a smaller public spending …nanced. Raising through
debt most of government revenues is also optimal in this non-competitive
framework.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies if imperfections in the labor market justify a di¤erent
optimal …scal policy. We …nd that …scal policy should not be used to sta-
bilize. Actually, when solving a Ramsey problem we …nd that optimality
requires constant government spending as a proportion of output. Further-
more, against the conventional belief, the optimal size of the government is
smaller when we introduce imperfect competition in the basic model.
These results have some implications for economic modelling and policy
recommendations. It isoften said that Real Business Cycle modelsdo not rec-
ommend active public policies because there are no rigidities and Walrasian
32equilibrium applies. This paper studies a model including these imperfec-
tions. We …nd that in spite of the fact that we are making standard assump-
tions with respect to functional forms, rigidities and solution methods, our
conclusions di¤er from those expected in keynesian models. The interest of
this paper is that, contrary to traditional analysis, the proposed framework
allows us to do “proper” study under rigidity. We have been precise about
agent’s preferences, technology and how agents take decisions. Moreover, we
have had to be explicit about what causes frictions in our economy and why
the public policy may be desirable.
We can only conjecture what could be introduced in the model in order
to …nd optimal stabilization policies. One of the assumptions that may be
causing our resultsis the shock we are considering. This is an aggregate shock
to the technology. A bad shock causes output to be small and reduces the
resources available in the economy. All agents are a¤ected by the shock in the
same way and the scope for the government intervention may be limited. In
any event, this paper has shown that the adopted approach is ‡exible enough
to analyze this kind of questions. Studying the features we could introduce
in the basic framework in order to get an optimal stabilization policies would
be an interesting future research.
33Appendix A
In this appendix we describe how debt payments are calculated when state
contingent debt is assumed.





juc;t+j [¿t+jwt+j(1 ¡ xt+j) ¡ gt+j]
uc;t
.
This equation can be rewritten as,






juc;t+j [¿t+jwt+j(1 ¡ xt+j) ¡ gt+j]
uc;t
.
For simulated series of the endogenous variables, we have calculated a
new series fBt+1g
5;000
t=0 setting B5;000 at its value in the steady state. We have
run OLS regressions of Bt+1 on a polynomial function P(¯;µt). We call the
resulting estimates b ¯.
For the series presented in section 2, we have calculated the following
expression to approximate b(µt),
b(µt) = P(b ¯;µt) + [¿twt(1 ¡ xt) ¡ gt].
Appendix B
This appendix describes the method we have used to solve the model when
incomplete markets are assumed. In order to …nd the optimal allocations
34for the endogenous variables, (ct;xt;gt;bt;Ãt;¹t;À1t;À2t), we have to solve
a system of equations. In the competitive model, these equations are the
following:
¡uc;t°µt(1 ¡ xt)
°¡1 + ux;t + Ãt-1t ¡ ¹tucc;tbt¡1°µt(1 ¡ xt)
°¡1 = 0








(À1t ¡À2t) + ÃtEt [uc;t+1]
ct + gt = µt(1 ¡ xt)
°
Ãt = Ãt¡1 + ¹t
bt¡1 = ¿twt(1 ¡ xt) ¡ gt + ¯bt
Et [uc;t+1]
uc;t
À1;t(M ¡ bt) = À2;t(bt ¡ M) = 0
(M ¡ bt);(bt ¡ M) ¸ 0 À1;t;À2;t · 0
with
¿t = 1 ¡
ux;t
wtuc;t
-1t = ucc;tµt°(1 ¡ xt)
°¡1(°µt(1 ¡ xt)
° ¡ gt) + uc;t°
2µt(1 ¡ xt)
°¡1
+uxx;t(1 ¡ xt) ¡ ux;t
-2t = uc;t + (ucc;t ¡ ucg;t)(°µt(1 ¡ xt)
° ¡gt)
This system of equations is quite similar to that we have to solve in the
non competitive model. In this case the equations are:
¡uc;t°µt(1 ¡ xt)
°¡1 + ux;t + Ãt©1t ¡ ¹t°ucc;tbt¡1°µt(1 ¡ xt)
°¡1 = 0








(À1t ¡À2t) + ÃtEt [uc;t+1]
ct + gt = µt(1 ¡ xt)
°
Ãt = Ãt¡1 + ¹t
bt¡1 = ¿twt(1 ¡ xt) ¡ gt + ¯bt
Et [uc;t+1]
uc;t
À1;t(M ¡ bt) = À2;t(bt ¡ M) = 0
(M ¡ bt);(bt ¡ M) ¸ 0 À1;t;À2;t · 0
with






° ¡ gt) + uc;t°
3µt(1 ¡ xt)
°¡1
+uxx;t(1 ¡ xt) ¡ux;t
©2t = uc;t° + °(ucc;t ¡ ucg;t)(°µt(1 ¡ xt)
° ¡ gt)
We have used the parameterized expectations approach (PEA) for solving
these systems. This method replaces the conditional expectation in these
equations with an approximating function depending on the state variables
and a set of parameters. Then, the equilibrium allocations are simulated
using this function in place of the conditional expectations. An iterative
procedure leads to a parameterization of the expectations that its consistent
with the series it generates. More details about this method can be found
in Marcet (1988), Den Haan and Marcet (1990) and Marcet and Marshall
(1994).





, and the vector of state variables is st = (µt;Ãt¡1;bt¡1). We














and where P 1
n and P2
n0 are polynomials of degree n and n0 respectively and
±
1 and ±
2 are the coe¢cients in these polynomials19 . We can distinguish
di¤erent steps followed to …nd the solution of PEA:
² Step 1: Substitute the conditional expectations in the system of equa-
tions with the functions '1(±
1;st) and '2(±
2;st) assuming a given initial
value ±0 for ±
1 and ±
2.
² Step 2: Create a long series for the technological shock µt and solve for
the endogenous variables for every period. We call the series we get
fzt(±0)g.
² Step 3: Calculate the expressions inside the conditional expectations
for fzt(±0)g and run a non-linear regression of these expressions on the
functions '1(:;st). We call the resulting coe¢cients S(±0)
² Step 4: Update ±0 by: ±1 = (1 ¡ ´)±0 + ´S(±0) with ´ 2 (0;1] and
iterate the procedure until a …xed point is found, that is, ±i = S(±i).





expectation is always positive and the second one can be postive or negative.
37The algorithm has been implemented in GAUSS. We have computed the
solutions using 10,000 observations. In order to choose the proper degree for
the polynomials we have performed the accuracy tests proposed in Den Haan
and Marcet (1989).
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